I. INTRODUCTION
The right to bear arms and the right to choose to have an abortion are both guaranteed to all Americans by the U.S. Constitution, 1 despite generally having starkly different constituencies-the former 4 . Dutton, supra note 3. to that approximately 19,000 suicides per year using guns. 8 In 2012, the number of gun murders per capita in the United States was approximately thirty times that in the United Kingdom-a country with strict gun control laws. 9 In 2015, at least 13,286 people were killed and 26,819 injured by guns in the United States. 10 In 2016, at least 15,078 people were killed and 30,615 injured by guns in the United States. 11 Of these people, 3,801 minors were killed or injured by firearms. 12 Yet, despite these statistics, firearm proponents urge American lawmakers to allow civilians unfettered access to firearms under the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 13 In 2011, 16.9 abortions were performed per 1,000 women of childbearing age, accounting for 1,100,000 abortions in the United States that year.
14 In 2012, there were 699,202 "legal induced abortions" reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-a significant decrease from the 2011 number. 15 In 2013, that number dropped to 664,435-a decrease of five percent. 16 The pro-life movement pushes lawmakers and lay people to view abortion as murder, 17 notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 declaration that Americans, specifically women, have a fundamental right to choose to abort a pregnancy until the point of viability. 18 Where gun control is lacking any controlling standard, abortion jurisprudence applies the standard that States cannot impose any restriction that imposes an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion. 19 8. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 157. In 2010, an additional 338,000 nonfatal crimes were committed with guns. Id. 9. Guns in the US, supra note 5; see WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 7, at 384. 10. Guns in the US, supra note 5. 11. Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/ past-tolls [https://perma.cc/SRA4-ZVYP].
12. Id. (3,128 teens between 12 and 17 years of age + 673 children between 0 and 11 years of age).
13. See infra notes 115-16. 14. Dutton, supra note 3. While abortion and gun control divide the country politically, this Note argues that the relationship between the two is constitutionally instructive. The U.S. Supreme Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence is in flux and provides little guidance to courts reviewing gun control legislation. In response, this Note argues that the "undue burden" test-the cornerstone of the U.S. Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence-intuits a reasonable approach to reviewing gun safety legislation. Part II describes the current-standing abortion framework, contextualizing the three most significant U.S. Supreme Court rulings, including its most recent in 2016, 20 to develop and explain the standard being cross-applied here. Part III defines the currentstanding gun control framework transpiring from the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, legislation, and statutory provisions. Part IV merges the two frameworks, contending that the "undue burden" framework is an immediate and workable solution to the lack of guidance and structure in Second Amendment jurisprudence at a time where gun control is at the forefront. Part V concludes, urging courts to borrow from abortion jurisprudence for a workable standard to apply in reviewing much-needed legislation regulating firearms in the United States.
II. CURRENT ABORTION FRAMEWORK
To apply the current abortion structure elsewhere, as this Note does, its function and background must generally be understood. 21 This Part discusses the Court's recognition of the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy and the Court's progression towards the current-standing 'undue burden' standard. Starting with Roe v. Wade in 1973, which is viewed as the beginning of modern polarization on the abortion debate, 22 the Court established that the right to have an abortion is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 23 Contrary to popular belief, however, there was a long history of abortion contention before Roe v. Wade. 24 Though the contentions are characterized differently today, abortion "had drawn attention to fundamental questions about the rights of women, the boundaries of medical authority, and the proper 20 . Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) . 21. For more in-depth conversation on the "undue burden" standard from the U.S. 27 and how it contributed to the "undue burden" standard, and explains how the "undue burden" logic underlies several topics outside of abortion, providing background and support for the argument herein that the "undue burden" framework is capable of intersectional application.
A. Roe v. Wade: Establishing the Fundamental Right to Choose
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of two Texas statutes that criminalized abortion and a Georgia statute that required a woman to obtain approval from a medical panel before receiving an abortion. 28 Plaintiff, Jane Roe, was a single woman who "was unable to get a 'legal' abortion . . . because her life did not appear to be threatened by . . . her pregnancy."
29 James Hubert Hallford, a physician who was arrested under the Texas statute for providing abortions, intervened in the action, 30 claiming the statutes were too vague and provided too little guidance to abortion providers who were required to determine when providing an abortion would be legal. 31 John and Mary Doe, plaintiffs in a companion complaint, filed suit on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated couples who experience fertility difficulties and may find themselves needing an abortion. 32 Interpreting the Article III standing doctrine, 33 the Court determined that jurisdiction was proper for the Roes' and Does' appeal because pregnancy presented a different circumstance than other injuries at law that justified an exception, or alteration, to the injury in fact standing requirement-a limited time period and likelihood of repetition to the same person. 34 In other words, because the Roes and/or Does could have become pregnant again and pregnancy is naturally limited to nine months, which may be insufficient to fully litigate a claim, the Court accepted that the injury, which originally brought rise to the lawsuit, was technically no longer present.
35
Upon review, grounding its decision in the long-standing "guarantee of personal privacy" 36 from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Roe Court established that a woman has a fundamental right to "deci[de] whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 37 The Court explained that when a state denies this choice to a woman, it imposes great detriment upon her, including maternal difficulties, "[p]sychological harm," distress from an unwanted child, the "stigma of unwed motherhood," etc. 38 Despite recognizing this right as fundamental, though, the Court reserved related state interests, declining to make the right to an abortion absolute.
39
Here arises the trimester framework that was established in Roe and used to review abortion legislation thereafter. Applying strict scrutiny, 40 the Court recognized the State's "interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life." 41 The Court determined that the State's "important and legitimate interest" in the mother's health begins at the end of the first trimester; therefore, the State must leave the decision to abort a pregnancy to a woman and her physician during the first trimester before this point. 42 In the second trimester, once the State's interests have ripened, the State may regulate abortions "to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." 43 Casey's "undue burden" framework provides the current standard of review for abortion legislation.
68
Rather than focusing on whether a state has justifiably infringed upon a constitutional right, the "undue burden" standard focuses on whether a statute effectuates a substantial infringement, 69 seemingly gleaning from a principle that restrictions are acceptable so long as the right may still be accessed. 70 Regardless of either side's view on the validity of this framework for abortion, the "undue burden" framework lends guidance and a sense of uniformity to abortion jurisprudence and has for almost twenty-five years. Arguably, the standard lends discretion to the court applying it because it is vaguely defined and allows courts to tailor individual analyses to specific facts. 71 Nevertheless, the framework provides at least a roadmap to courts for reviewing statutes affecting women's access to abortion. 78 Though abortion is polarized and a large part of the population would prefer the elimination of abortion, some large groups strongly oppose the elimination of abortion as a legal right and would accuse the Court of a blatant injustice if it were to take away a long-standing right. Others speculated that the Court would leave intact the right but overturn, or alter, Casey's "undue burden" standard. As expressed by Justice Scalia's dissent in Casey, 79 there was ambiguity in the Court's definition of an "undue burden" that allowed for clarification in Hellerstedt. that "[t]he rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer." 82 A close reading of the Hellerstedt opinion seems to indicate, at the least: (1) a minimization of deference to the legislature in "undue burden" review; 83 (2) an increase in the breadth of effects that may be considered in an "undue burden" analysis, such as the effect on clinics and physicians which translates to an effect on patients; 84 and (3) a shift towards Roe's focus on the physicianpatient relationship and viewing abortion as a medical procedure similar to others like childbirth or colonoscopies. 85 Ultimately, the Court struck down HB2 as unconstitutional under Casey's "undue burden" framework.
86
The doctrinal significance of the Hellerstedt opinion is ambiguous. On one hand, Professor Mary Ziegler argues that the Hellerstedt opinion contributed rigor to the "undue burden" standard. 87 Until
Hellerstedt, "the court almost never found anything to be unduly burdensome."
88 Following Hellerstedt, which "perfectly captures the spirit of Casey" by not completely satisfying anyone, Ziegler argues:
"Those on both sides will have to pull together extensive, persuasive and often expensive trial evidence about the effect and purpose of an abortion regulation." 89 Ziegler predicts "that we have not seen the last of battles about the medical, scientific and sociological evidence about abortion, both inside and outside of court."
90 Nevertheless,
Ziegler contends that Hellerstedt helped clarify what courts may consider when conducting an "undue burden" analysis.
91
To the contrary, discounting the significance of Hellerstedt, Professor Kevin Walsh, for example, argues that Hellerstedt was "a doctrinally insignificant but ideologically ominous case in a transitional Term."
92 Walsh argues that the opinion brought "proportionality review" to the "undue burden" analysis while allowing the opinions and political views of Justices to overpower the law. 93 Indicating that the 3. "Undue Burden" Standard Within Abortion
Where the "undue burden" standard falls within standard constitutional doctrine is difficult to discern. Doctrinally, the "undue burden" standard is a function of strict scrutiny because it is used to review legislation affecting the fundamental right to access an abortion, which spawns from the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 95 However, in application, the "undue burden" standard vacillates between intermediate and strict scrutiny. Before Hellerstedt, the only law that the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated by applying the "undue burden" standard was the spousal consent provision reviewed in Casey. 96 The four other provisions at issue in Casey and the PartialBirth Abortion Act, which the Court reviewed in Gonzales v. Carhart, 97 were upheld as constitutional under this standard, indicating something less than strict scrutiny because these laws would likely have been stricken under a rigid strict-scrutiny analysis.
98
In Hellerstedt, the Court seemingly heightened the rigidity of the "undue burden" standard, or gave it more teeth, by invalidating Texas's HB2 in its entirety under the "undue burden" standard. 99 The Court clearly indicated that the appropriate review of abortion legislation is more rigorous than rational basis review, which is "applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue." 100 To this effect, Justice Thomas states in his dissent: The majority's undue-burden test looks far less like our postCasey precedents and far more like the strict-scrutiny standard that Casey rejected, under which only the most compelling rationales justified restrictions on abortion. One searches the majority opinion in vain for any acknowledgement of the "premise central" to Casey's rejection of strict scrutiny: "that the government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life" from conception, not just in regulating medical procedures.
101
Signaling something less than strict scrutiny, though, Justice Breyer's majority states the Court's holding: "We conclude that neither of these provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each imposes." 102 Referring to the "legitimate"
interests recognized in Roe and the "valid" interests discussed in Casey, it seems that even with the added rigor, "undue burden" is practically something less than strict scrutiny. Due to the invasiveness, privacy, intimacy, and health implications of an abortion procedure, the undue burden standard may not be appropriate for the abortion context, as it may exclude consideration of several of these concerns that were emphasized in Roe. Regardless, the Court did not use its recent opportunity in Hellerstedt to overturn or change the governing abortion framework. And, the standard's underlying logic translates well to other individual constitutional contexts, such as the Second Amendment. The next Part explains the presence that firearms currently hold in America and the legal frameworks within which they are protected and regulated.
III. FIREARMS CURRENTLY IN THE UNITED STATES
Ten years before Roe, firearms were brought to the forefront of political discussion when John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. 103 One author argued that this was the turning point at which politics began to focus on the weapon as the problem rather than the individual committing the crime. 104 Whatever the cause, America has become increasingly polarized on both abortion and gun control for the past fifty years.
" 108 This Part canvasses the constitutional framework that provides the fundamental right to bear arms, explains current (federal and state) statutory controls on accessing firearms, and describes the gun-related violence that has shaken America in recent years. Seemingly, pioneers of the discussion are minimally limited in possible arguments because no standing framework exists under which gun safety legislation is reviewed. Thus, defining the Second Amendment and its protections is the rhetorical focus, rather than what restrictions should be allowed within established boundaries.
A. Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
109
Unlike the right to abortion, which is a liberty interest found within the unenumerated rights of protected "liberty" within the Due Process Clause, 110 the right to bear arms is enumerated within the Bill of Rights.
111 Firearms are used for a myriad of purposes in the United States, including self-defense, 112 
Federal Legislation
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 (the "Brady Act") was the most expansive federal gun control legislation. 131 The Brady Act "require[d, among other provisions,] federally licensed firearms dealers [ ] to perform background checks" on persons seeking to purchase a firearm to ensure the purchase is legal. 132 The Brady Act established the National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS") to conduct the required background checks when one purchases a firearm.
133 Current federal statutes, though, allow firearm purchases to proceed anyway if the background check process is not complete, or has not raised any warning, after three days. 134 In other words, if a required background check takes more than three days for any reason, the requirement is nullified, and the purchase proceeds without the results. This three-day release is known as a "default proceed." 135 The NICS, with the "default proceed," still exists as the entity that conducts background checks for firearm purchases when required. But, not only does this requirement have a narrow time-frame, it does not encompass all gun sales in the United States. The NICS only applies to licensed firearm sellers, excusing approximately forty percent of gun purchases from this screening requirement, 136 including purchases made at gun shows.
137 Thus, federal background checks are conducted when they take less than three days on qualifying purchases.
Also limiting the Brady Act's reach, the Act applied only to handguns. In 1989, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives identified forty-three types of assault weapons, which were not affected by the Brady Act.
138 Assault weapons are semiautomatic, meaning once the trigger is depressed and the gun fires, a new bullet is automatically reloaded.
139 Though assault weapons account for a small part of the entire population of guns in America, they are ubiquitous among mass shooters. 140 In 1994, the Assault Weapons Ban ("AWB") was enacted to ban nineteen types of assault weapons. 141 In September 2004, the new Congress, which had been strongly lobbied by the NRA, allowed the AWB to expire, so civilians could once again access assault weapons. ny, 143 are fugitives from justice, 144 are using or addicted to illegal substances, 145 or have been determined mentally incapacitated. 146 The same statute further reflects a significant concern for perpetrators of domestic violence and restricts anyone who is restrained by the court from "harassing, stalking, or threatening [his or her] intimate partner . . . or child" 147 or who has been convicted of any domestic violence crime. 148 Other statutory concerns include tampering with a weapon or the sale/transfer of stolen weapons.
149 Federal statutes are bound by congressional jurisdictional limits emanating from the Constitution, leaving a majority of gun control issues within the prerogative of states' police powers. 150 Thus, states individually enact legislation governing firearms in their jurisdiction. Nationwide state legislation is outlined in Subsection 3 below after President Obama's 2016 Executive Order relating to firearms is explained in Section 2 below.
2016 Executive Order
The lack of interpretation of the Second Amendment and resulting absence of applicable framework leaves a wide-range of gaps to be filled by any governmental branch. Recognizing the prevalence of gun violence in the United States and a glaring need for reform in gun control, President Obama released a relevant Executive Order in early 2016. 151 The Executive Order, by reinterpreting current legislation, attempted to improve the NICS background process by extending the time in which background checks are processed, expanding the scope of the background requirement, and hiring over 200 additional "examiners and other staff to help process these background checks." 152 Similarly, the Executive Order provides that funding will be provided for additional law enforcement officers to enforce gun laws.
153 Further, the Order directs governmental departments to conduct or endorse research on gun safety and related technology.
154 President Obama's Executive Order-whether a constitutional use of power or 155 -further demonstrates the vacuum of Second Amendment guidance from jurisprudence, leaving the legislative and executive branches to individually fill in gaps as they see fit, taking into consideration interests of their constituents and interest groups.
State Legislation
With respect to gun control, each state acts as a sovereign entity in crafting legislation, so gun control legislation varies significantly between states.
156 "State gun laws fill enormous gaps that exist in our nation's federal laws, and help to reduce gun violence and keep citizens safe." 157 In 2015, California was the state with the "strongest gun reform measures in the country," followed by Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, respectively. 158 Those on the other end of the spectrum with the least amount of gun control legislation were Arizona, Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, and Wyoming. 159 In 2016, California was again ranked first in gun safety, followed by Connecticut, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and Hawaii, respectively. 160 A state's rank in protective measures, which considers the amount of state gun control legislation, seems to be reflected in their respective gun violence rates. 161 For example, in 2015, California and Connecticut ranked forty-two and forty-seven, respectively, in "Gun Death Rate Rank," and Mississippi and Wyoming ranked three and seven, respectively. 162 In 2016, California ranked forty-three and Connecticut ranked forty-six. Massachusetts ranked last (fifty). 163 These states will guide the legislation summary in this discussion to describe the most protective and least restrictive examples in the country.
Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun
California, the most proactive state in the nation on gun control, seems to have built upon federal restrictions to ensure that the most protective means are in place. For example, although the federal AWB expired in 2004, California bans civilians completely from possessing, selling, or obtaining any assault weapon. 164 California also imposes further implications for illegal possession of firearms whereby illegal firearms-considered a public nuisance-are confiscated and destroyed. 165 California is an example of a state using its Tenth Amendment police powers to safeguard its citizens from firearms beyond the protections provided by federal laws. 166 By contrast, Wyoming has an individualized constitutional provision that is broader than the U.S. Constitution, which provides:
The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state shall not be denied. 167 Wyoming does not require that purchasers possess a permit or license to obtain a firearm, and sellers err on the side of granting the purchase. 168 There is no state law prohibiting the possession of machine guns, or assault weapons. 169 Thus, federal restrictions seem to act as the outermost limits on the sale and possession of firearms in 162. LAW CTR. TO Wyoming. 170 In other words, Wyoming does not further affect firearms in the state, deferring to federal restrictions for the ceiling of restriction.
C. Recent Gun Violence in the United States
Regrettably, shootings have become all-too-familiar in American life. Random acts of violence have taken many American lives in recent years. This Section details a few, significant public shootings in recent years to highlight the effect firearms have on modern U.S. society.
Just one example of a seemingly non-pointed, or random, shooting was in October of 2017 when Stephen Paddock, sixty-four years old, "rained a rapid-fire barrage on an outdoor concert festival" in Las Vegas, Nevada, from his hotel room on the 34th floor of a nearby hotel. 172 The attack left at least 59 dead and 527 others injured, making it the deadliest mass shooting in modern U.S. history. 173 Five years earlier, in June 2012, James Holmes, twenty years-old, ambushed a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, during a midnight showing of the newly released The Dark Knight Rises. 174 He was suited in armor and wearing a mask. 175 Twelve were fatally wounded in the sudden mass shooting.
176
School shootings seem to be a particular gun violence issue that both terrifies Americans and polarizes the gun debate. "[T]he number of school killings in the U.S. between 2000 and 2010 was one less than the number in dozens of other countries combined," including Canada, China, England, France, India, Israel, Japan, Russia, Thailand, and Yemen. 177 One of the most significant in recent times was December 14, 2012, when the country was shaken by a shooting that invaded what is supposed to be one of the safest and most innocent places in everyday life: an elementary school. 178 Adam Lanza, a twenty-year-old, took his mother's semi-automatic rifles to Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, and opened fire.
179
Twenty children and six adult staff members lost their lives on that day. 180 In addition to the Sandy Hook massacre, there have been multiple shootings at U.S. colleges and universities in recent years, including Florida State University in 2014 (three wounded and shooter killed) 181 and Virginia Tech in 2007 (thirty-three deaths including the shooter and twenty-three wounded). 182 With the rise in violence and resulting fear in American schools, school shootings are now a real concern for school officials. 183 This sampling of information on recent school shootings in the United States shows that guns are a real threat to schools and a relied upon instrument for attackers. And, more significantly, the prevalence of gun violence in schools is disturbing U.S. education systems.
Just after the Sandy Hook tragedy, thirty-three percent of U.S. parents were concerned for their child's safety at school. 184 In 2015, twenty-nine percent of U.S. parents retained that fear. 185 The shooting seemed to spark the most recent, polarized iteration of America's gun debate. 186 Gun rights activists, spearheaded by the NRA, responded with a push for increased guns in schools. 187 increasing the amount of firearms will lessen the amount of violence due to the equality of power on both sides of an attack. 188 By their logic, if teachers (or other school authorities) 189 are armed, then school shootings are less likely to occur because shooters will know they will be met with reciprocal power. 190 On the other side, proponents of increased gun control argue that further restricting access to firearms will lessen the prevalence of senseless violence in America because such restrictions will help ensure that only responsible carriers are allowed to handle such deadly weapons. Or, they counter the gun rights activists' proposal by suggesting that an increased likelihood of injuries or deaths will follow from the increased presence of firearms in schools. 192 Three were killed, including one Colorado Springs police officer, and several others were injured.
193 After a several-hour stand-off with police, Dear was finally apprehended by police and interrogated. 194 During questioning, Dear "mentioned 'baby parts' . . . by authorities, 196 the U.S. Attorney General and the President of Planned Parenthood characterized the shooting as a "crime against women."
197
In mid-2016, Omar Mateen, a former security guard, opened fire in an Orlando nightclub most frequented by homosexual patrons. 198 Mateen used a nine-millimeter semi-automatic handgun and a .223-caliber assault-style rifle, killing forty-nine and wounding at least fifty more.
199 "Mateen bought the guns he used in the massacre . . . a few days before the assault. He did not need a security guard's license to buy them." 200 Mateen's father remembered Mateen being "angered by the sight of two men kissing during a trip to Miami." 201 The Pulse shooting was the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history at the time.
202
In July 2016, the execution of Dallas police officers came as a political response to racial tension between police officers and citizens. 203 Micah Johnson, expressly angry at "white people" and "white [police] officers," used a rifle from an elevated position to execute police officers in the streets of Dallas during a peaceful protest following the death of two black citizens by white police officers. 204 The Dallas shooting produced the deadliest day for law enforcement since September 11, 2001-two records of lethality by firearms broken in the United States in a matter of one month.
205
Guns being at the center of political debates now heighten the concern of firearms being used to make a statement. "For the crazed gunman, . . . the question is how to prevent such carnage . . . . Answering that question requires a close examination of the system of laws that govern gun ownership, particularly limits on who can pur-chase guns and how much firepower they can obtain." 206 The attacks by Dear, Mateen, and Johnson show that guns are the weapons of choice for "domestic terrorists" seeking to make political statements in the United States.
IV. CONVERGING THE TWO: APPLYING THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD TO SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS "The possession of a handgun greatly increases the possibility that you or someone you love will be killed with or as a result of that weapon." 207 Most of the weapons used in recent mass shootings were purchased legally and involved NICS background processing. 208 At least eight of those shooters had criminal backgrounds or mental health histories that slipped through current controls, allowing their purchases to go through. 209 This Part converges the arguments and reasoning surrounding gun control and abortion restrictions, demonstrating that the differences between the two areas are slighter than they initially appear, and the framework from the latter may tremendously aid in reviewing legislation on the former. This Part, framed by the "undue burden" analysis from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 210 and Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 211 applies the "undue burden" standard to progressive gun control legislation, contending that such provisions-inquiring into the purchaser's mental health, eliminating the "default proceed," and reinstating a ban on assault weapons-could pass constitutional muster under this framework.
Opponents of gun control argue that proponents are too idealistic to realize that any legitimate restrictions will only create an environment where the only gun owners are those whom the laws seek to prohibit from owning firearms. 212 This is because those who should not own guns would be the ones willing to defy the legislation, or break the law, and wrongly retain their firearms. 213 Regardless of partisan controversy, the facts underlying recent gun violence in the United States show the insufficiency of current gun control laws. 214 Aside from the narrowly construed Supreme Court Second Amendment jurisprudence, there is little guidance as to how Second Amendment violations are reviewed. 215 In other words, courts are in need of a workable standard for reviewing gun control legislation, especially in the wake of recent gun violence in the United States.
Considering the political influence of the legislative and executive branches, the judiciary-a theoretically politics-free branch-seems to be the appropriate avenue for instituting guidance in Second Amendment review. Turning to the abortion framework for guidance, the "undue burden" standard may be imperfect, but, it will undoubtedly help to provide a needed infrastructure to review gun control legislation under the Second Amendment, which is presently glaringly absent from case law.
Introducing its Roe v. Wade opinion, the Court stated:
One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.
216
In other words, abortion is a very personal and political topic. Note, though, how easily this entire statement can be transposed to gun control by exchanging just the last term in the Court's statement, i.e. ". . . conclusions about gun control." "As with other controversial issues such as abortion and affirmative action, opinions about gun control are almost always passionately held and in diametric opposition."
217 Both issues, though privately guided by emotion and diverse personal views, 218 have constitutional overtones that invoke various degrees of governmental interests and allowable restrictions. substantially similar in their existence and controlling framework. 220 Both are fundamental within the U.S. Constitution. 221 Both are "individual" rights, meaning they belong to the individual seeking to exercise them; 222 yet, both rights affect others surrounding the one exercising the right. 223 Feminists and abortion activists may disagree and argue that abortion is a decision solely between the woman and her physician. But, there is an argument that, at least in some situations where others are privy to information about the woman's decision, others are affected by abortions. For gun control, the connection is much simpler, as the victim and a countless number of those close to the victim are affected when a firearm is discharged unlawfully. In fact, the general public is affected by gun control laws-whether broadened or narrowed-at least to the extent that they affect the society in which they live.
224
Proponents of firearm deregulation hold beliefs that mirror the pro-life incrementalism strategy. 225 Supporters of an unrestricted Second Amendment fear that each gun control law that passes is a step towards a total ban on their cherished weapons. David Hardy argues that their fear of any gun-control measures is reasonable because "[t]hey have heard opponents describe their purpose to eliminate handgun ownership, with any lesser measures simply a means to that end."
226 So, Hardy argues, "opposition even to modest restrictions is both logical and natural." the same political party) use this exact strategy that they harshly reject for gun control to restrict abortion rights.
228
Applying the argument that the Second Amendment should be completely unrestricted to abortion results in this: The right to have an abortion is a fundamental right that cannot be denied to any U.S. citizen. A fetus is not considered a "person" within the language of the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, does not hold any constitutional right, including life. 229 Thus, a woman has the right to abort her pregnancy up until the point that the fetus is born. Of course, we know that conservatives would repulse at this argument; instead, they would prefer that the right to an abortion be eliminated. 230 And, the right to choose to have an abortion is more restricted than that logic suggests due to a state's interests related to this fundamental right that the Court has recognized.
For as long as the Casey framework stands in the abortion context, a state has recognized interests in restricting abortion up until a certain point. That point has been demarcated as when "state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 231 To that end, this discussion is not meant to affect abortion jurisprudence, as the argument herein does not aim to suggest or discourage any change in abortion framework. For discussion purposes, this Note accepts and applies the standing abortion precedent.
A. Providing What the Second Amendment Is Missing
Second Amendment precedent "nowhere says or implies that the government is forbidden to place any restrictions at all on protected weapons." 232 A look at Second Amendment jurisprudence, gun safety statutes, and policy concerns illuminates an absence of direction for courts reviewing gun control legislation, 233 which is undeniably impending. This Note's solution of borrowing from abortion and applying the "undue burden" framework to gun control is helpful for several reasons.
Establishing a sort of infrastructure in which Second Amendment jurisprudence can develop will provide uniformity and consistency within the case law. This is practically important for several reasons. 234 For one, uniformity is a long-standing concern of the U.S. Supreme Court. 235 Likewise, with the evolution of jurisprudence within a consistent standard, courts may look to other jurisdictions or forums that have applied the "undue burden" test to analogize in determining the validity of a statute sub judice. In other words, consistency will create coherence and guidance in the Second Amendment arena.
Further, although abortion claims the "undue burden" framework as its own unique standard, the principles underlying this framework are not novel to the Court. We see similar reasoning and resulting standards in other areas of constitutional analysis that are much more established and developed than abortion or gun control. For example, in freedom of association (First Amendment) jurisprudence, under Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 236 the Court asks whether the entrant proposes a substantial obstacle to the expressive institution achieving its message. 237 Applying this "abortion framework" to gun control results in a symbiotic relationship between the two arenas. By developing Second Amendment "undue burden" case law, the framework and its inter-workings will be more illuminated, which will further guide abortion jurisprudence. Guided by "[t]he conventional understanding of fundamental rights in constitutional law" and how legislation affecting them must be analyzed, 238 this Part proceeds through the application of the "undue burden" standard to gun safety legislation.
B. State's Interests "[I]t makes sense to do everything we can to keep guns out of the hands of people who would try to do others harm or to do themselves harm." 239 Following an "undue burden" analysis, the Court must first review and determine that a state has legitimate and compelling interests to protect in regulating the right. In Casey, the Court discussed the external implications of abortion, despite being an individual right:
It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted.
240
Note the parallel between this analysis and gun control, where the impact reverberates well past the gun bearer. If the state has an interest in protecting the life of the fetus once it reaches a certain point in the pregnancy, 241 then the state surely has an interest in protecting the lives of adults and children living in U.S. society. 242 Intuitively, the latter interest is stronger than the former as the constituents are "persons" protected by the U.S. Constitution, whereas an unborn fetus is not. 243 One may argue that the termination of a fetus is sure for every abortion, whereas restricting gun control is attempting to limit a speculative injury. But the mere capability of each firearm and the prevalence of gun violence in the United States, especially recently, indicates that this injury is not so speculative. Each American has felt the harm caused by firearms, whether personally or through the threat that permeates modern-day America. 244 This societal fear, as well as the decrease in Americans' safety, caused by unrestricted or irresponsible firearm ownership is fodder for a legitimate state concern and justifies regulation.
C. Burdening the Right
Once the Court is comfortable that the state has a sufficient interest to protect, it must determine whether the regulation sub judice creates an "undue burden" on one trying to access or exercise his or her constitutional right.
245 "Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound respect for [its legitimate interests] are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the" fundamental right they 240 are regulating. 246 Applying this structure from abortion law to gun control provides insight into the logical inconsistency embedded within conservative rhetoric between the two topics. This Section juxtaposes the abortion provisions reviewed in Casey to recently suggested gun control provisions within the Casey "undue burden" framework and its application. 247 Reviewing the informed consent provision, the Casey Court found that a woman's guilt or regret and her assumed resulting mental health from receiving an abortion was a legitimate state interest that could be protected through abortion restrictions. 256 In doing so, the Court found the informed consent provision, requiring women to receive physician-provided information regarding the abortion procedure before the procedure, to be constitutional. 257 The only condition upon this holding was that the information provided by a physician or clinic must be scientifically reliable, with deference to the legislature on scientific reliability. 258 But Justice Ginsburg argued, in her Gonzales v. Carhart dissent referencing Casey, 259 that women are not as ignorant as the Court assumed and would self-impose the appropriate psychological ramifications without reinforcement from legislature-prescribed information.
260
In the gun control context, a state protects society at large, rather than the mental health of the applicant, from the applicant's possible mental health afflictions with increased background checks into the purchaser's mental health. 261 Contrary to abortion, the mental deficiency of an applicant for the purchase of a firearm does affect others.
In fact, the number of others affected is seemingly innumerable, depending upon the gunman's target, and, the others affected are also entitled to full constitutional protection for which a state is responsible. Thus, a state's interest in protecting society from incompetent gun owners appears larger than-or certainly as great as-a state's interest in protecting an unborn fetus or a woman from regret. This is not to say that all mentally ill individuals are dangerous or that they should be denied constitutional protections and privileges. Instead, to protect the lives and well-being of its citizens, a state has an interest in requiring mental health screenings before one may of the members of the National Rifle Association. See 259. The dissent disputed the Court's holding that upheld an absolute ban on partialbirth abortion and argued that a medical necessity provision was required to allow such procedures when necessary for the mother's health; and, such necessity provision was supported by medical evidence in the District Court's record. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. purchase a firearm. This argument is not meant to suggest that any history of mental illness or mental health treatment should disqualify an individual from purchasing a firearm. Stability, even with a history of mental illness, could be shown through treatment or medication upon such screening. Such restrictions and specifications would be left to the state legislatures. Nevertheless, the state is entitled to scientifically reliable information regarding the applicant's mental health and criminal background before allowing the applicant to purchase a firearm.
Eliminating the "Default Proceed"
Combine the few current gun control provisions and you end up with this: a cloudy personal history delays the NICS background check; once seventy-two hours have passed, the "default proceed" takes effect and excuses the purchaser from the background requirement. 262 The purchaser, whose background is now unknown or, at the most, partially known to the seller, walks away with a legal firearm despite a possible history that would have prevented the purchase, had the background check run its course. 263 Hence, the elimination of the "default proceed" seems to be the obvious next step in increasing safety in firearm ownership. Primarily, similar to the Casey Court's discussion supporting its "undue burden" framework, the background check requirement under the Brady Act is no more than a "structural mechanism by which the State" ensures the safe administration of firearms. 264 First, conducting the background check does not require permission or dependence upon any relative of the applicant. In Casey, the Court found that abortion restrictions requiring the consent of the woman's spouse seeking an abortion were unconstitutional due to the pressure they would create on the woman to involve him in her decision. 265 The Casey Court upheld the parental consent provisionrequiring consent from the parents of a minor seeking an abortionbecause there was a judicial bypass option where the minor could avoid getting her parents' consent. 266 Requiring a background check before one can purchase a firearm does not require the purchaser to involve any private third-party in their decision to purchase a firearm. Thus, the background check requirement is valid under the Casey reasoning regarding the parental and spousal consent provisions.
Second, purchasing a gun should be done with forethought and responsibility. So, a twenty-four hour waiting period before purchasing a gun would not unduly impair one's right to bear arms. "The idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the statute directs that important information become part of the background of the decision." 267 In any situation that a person purchases a gun and needs the gun immediately, there is likely concern of an impulsive and dangerous thought process that could intrude upon others' constitutional and human right to life. 268 Likewise, any planned attack is detrimental to society, as we have seen in the recent past. 269 Extending the time that it takes for one to obtain a firearm, or throwing off their 'plan' by a day or two is anything but detrimental to both the safety of society and the purchaser's criminal record. Likewise, the Casey Court found that a twentyfour hour waiting period for seeking an abortion was not an "undue burden" and was therefore constitutional because the abortion could be conducted the next day just the same. 270 If, for some reason, a situation required immediate and violent action, police and governmental authorities are in place to serve those purposes. Admittedly, there is a glaring counter-factual scenario to the police solution-where a home invasion presents imminent danger that cannot be curbed by police action due to the delay required to call police and for police to arrive. lished that the Second Amendment entitles one to protect himself with a firearm in his home. 272 Nevertheless, this situation would only exist without a firearm (for those who wish to have one) for the generally minimal period of time between the beginning of the NICS process and the end. Lawmakers have explicitly accepted that previous felons, or others statutorily restricted from firearm access, may be unable to defend themselves with firearms by restricting their rights.
Even seventy-two hours (the three-day cut-off established by the "default proceed") would not be an undue burden to one's Second Amendment rights under the same reasoning, as one's health and daily function is not affected by the additional wait-period for receiving a purchased firearm; 273 and a state's interest in ensuring the safety and stability of the gun purchaser is compelling. In fact, California requires a minimum ten-day, or 240-hour, waiting period before any sale or transfer of a firearm. 274 In the abortion context, the difference between one and three days, not to mention ten, may be more burdensome on the right-holder, as travel may be a hindrance, 275 medical needs may be exacerbated by the increased wait-period, 276 or other time-sensitive needs may be delayed. Even with concerns of immediacy in the abortion context, seventy-two hour waiting periods are on the books in some states. So, the lack of medical sensitivity or potential psychological harm-accepting prima facie the Court's argument in Casey and Carhart-in firearm purchases indicates that increasing the wait-period by eliminating the "default proceed" is not an undue burden on one's fundamental right to bear arms and is therefore constitutional.
Further, those who are most likely to be affected by the increased wait-period are those who the state has a heightened interest in investigating before allowing them to obtain a firearm. "In fact, the FBI has found that a purchaser whose NICS check takes longer than [twenty-four] hours to complete is [twenty] times more likely to be a prohibited purchaser than other applicants." 277 Applying Casey here, "[a] particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle. Whether a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct inquiry from whether it is a substantial obstacle even as to the [people] in that group."
278 Therefore, that those with messier backgrounds have to wait longer to purchase a firearm does not necessitate a substantial obstacle or undue burden. Such a finding would be contrapositive to the purpose of the background requirement: to keep those with a history that would indicate improper firearm use from owning firearms to further the state's interest in keeping America safe.
Reinstating a Ban on Assault Weapons
Had the AWB existed at the time, the following shootings (and others) could have been avoided or, at least, minimized: Aurora, Colorado (July 2012), Sandy Hook (December 2012), San Bernardino (December 2015).
279 So, Legislators' concerns when the AWB was first enacted in 1994 have not been remedied, and assault weapons continue to heighten the danger and fatality of gun violence in the United States.
Reinstating a ban on assault weapons would also not place an undue burden on one's Second Amendment rights because the individual purpose of the Second Amendment-self-defense-can be served adequately without assault weapons. 280 Assault weapons are military-style firearms that are designed to aid in combat with their rapid reloading capabilities. Any justified, individual use of a firearm in American civilization should not require such type of weapon.
V. CONCLUSION
Murder is the most feared violent crime in America. 281 Yet the murder rhetoric and how to eliminate its effect on U.S. society is misguided. 282 The rights enumerated within the Second Amendment and the right established within the Fourteenth Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe are more similar than their opposing proponents and discussion portray. Borrowing the "undue burden" framework from abortion lends guidance to the constitutionality of gun regulations aimed to protect and preserve American society. An 282. There is no argument whether discharging a gun towards innocent people is murder. Cf. Rosenbluth, supra note 17, at 1247 (" [K] illing innocent human life is murder.").
immediate solution to the lack of guidance for reviewing legislation affecting one's Second Amendment rights, as presented herein, is to apply the "undue burden" framework from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Whether this test is perfect is irrelevant, as it will provide guidance, consistency, and some uniformity to Second Amendment analyses. A perfect standard is likely impossible, but starting with an established standard that proves to be transferrable and analogous is a step toward building discussion, jurisprudence, and thereby gun safety in America.
